The expansion of digital platforms in recent years has profoundly transformed the way citizens access traditional services. This is true for sectors as diverse as transport and investment.
The lottery sector has not been immune to this movement. Companies have emerged that, acting as agents of consumers, intermediate bets with Caixa Econômica Federal’s accredited lottery houses. These are the so-called “courriers,” a French term meaning messenger — someone entrusted with delivering a message on behalf of another.
The business model of these platforms has been legally challenged by Caixa itself, under the argument of the state monopoly guaranteed over lottery games. But while the matter is still new in the courts and no consolidated jurisprudence exists — with decisions both in favor and against Caixa — Cade has already ruled in favor of the companies and, more importantly, provided essential clarifications that reinforce the legitimacy of this activity.
In practice, the user, through a mandate contract (Article 653 of the Brazilian Civil Code), grants powers to the platform so that it may place, in their name, the requested bets with Caixa, including services such as syndicate betting ('megabolões'). In other words, there is no direct lottery operation, but simply a mandate granted by the consumer in exchange for a service that brings convenience and technology to the client.
Along these lines, there is even a legal opinion from professor and jurist Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet that reinforces this understanding. According to him, the intermediary platform “does not draw numbers, does not run its own lottery, and does not pay out prizes. It merely acts, on behalf of its client, before Caixa itself, placing the lottery bets requested by the client within the federal lottery network.”
Thus, intermediation does not remove Caixa’s authority over lottery operations nor compromise the social allocation of lottery proceeds. On the contrary, it contributes to expanding the player base.
At the administrative level, Cade has also addressed the matter. In its judgment of Appeal No. 08700.005885/2023-52, in February of this year, it held that there are two distinct markets: the primary one, for lottery operations, which is Caixa’s legal monopoly; and the secondary one, for online intermediation services, where digital platforms operate.
Technical Note 16/2025 was even clearer in recording that, according to a statement from the Ministry of Finance through the Secretariat of Prizes and Betting, the legitimacy of the business is evident. The Secretariat confirmed to Cade that “there is no regulation or express prohibition of the intermediation activity carried out by platforms in capturing bets” and that, in practice, “the platforms do not sell their own tickets but instead register them through Caixa-authorized lottery outlets.”
This distinction is crucial: Caixa retains intact its monopoly over the creation and sale of lottery products; the platforms provide convenience and ancillary services — such as syndicate bets, combined bets, and payment facilitation — that do not compete with the core public service.
The Federal Constitution guarantees, in Article 170, the free exercise of economic activities, except in cases where the law provides otherwise. As jurist Ingo Wolfgang Sarlet noted: “As there is no law prohibiting lottery intermediation activity — and there is none — it may be freely carried out.”
It is, therefore, a legitimate private activity, subject only to general consumer protection rules, civil liability, and contractual transparency. Prohibiting it would amount to restricting, without legal basis, free enterprise and free competition.
The digital intermediation of lottery bets is not an affront to Caixa’s legal monopoly, but rather a modern mechanism to bring consumers closer to the official lottery network. The full amount of the bet remains destined to Caixa, preserving the social purpose of the lotteries.
Again, Ingo Sarlet explains: “The services offered by the intermediary are beneficial to Caixa, as they attract bettors who, without the services of courriers, would not participate. This is the case, for example, of those who, although they wish to bet, are unwilling to spend the R$30 (US$5.54) minimum required by Caixa’s Online Lottery, nor to travel personally to a lottery agency.”
A study by FGV (Getúlio Vargas Foundation), published in 2023, highlighted the numerous economic benefits resulting from digital intermediation of bets. According to the survey, the presence of these services generated an average annual increase of R$556 million (US$102.58m) in Caixa Econômica Federal’s revenue over ten years, reaching approximately R$870 million (US$160.52m) in 2021 alone. In practice, this revenue benefited not only Caixa but also the social areas funded by lottery proceeds, reinforcing that the model does not diminish but rather expands state monopoly revenues.
The FGV report also indicates that, in a scenario of clearer and more favorable regulation, the impact of intermediation could approach R$1 billion (US$185m) annually, potentially reaching up to R$1.9 billion (US$350m) if currently restricted promotional mechanisms were allowed. In other words, this is a model capable of attracting new bettors, expanding the revenue base, and modernizing the sector, with gains not only for private platforms but above all for Caixa and Brazilian society as a whole.
What these platforms add is convenience, innovation, and the inclusion of bettors who otherwise would not participate. Criminalizing or trying to stifle this model — as Cade itself has warned when opening administrative proceedings on anticompetitive practices — disregards the constitutional principles of free enterprise and competition.
From the perspective of law and economics, therefore, the activity is legitimate and deserves recognition as such. In some respects, the dilemma between state monopoly, its efficiency or inefficiency — a topic with numerous repercussions over the years in Brazil — gains a new chapter in the case of Caixa and intermediary platforms focused on technology and convenience.
The most notable comparable dilemma was that of the postal monopoly of Correios and the subsequent expansion of e-commerce. The logic in this case, as in many other sectors, has been market opening and the entry of new players — even as the monopoly is maintained for core activities. The results make clear that more convenience, more services, and more players bring gains to both the Union and consumers.
Ana Clara Barros
Lawyer and Legal Director of the International Gaming Association (Aigaming)
