In recent months, the National Congress has resumed debate on the proposal to ban so-called bets on individual events, also known as secondary markets, which correspond to bets on cards, corners, or fouls. The justification for the restriction is that these markets would be the most vulnerable to match-fixing, compromising the integrity of the sport.
The idea may sound intuitive, but is it really effective? A closer analysis shows it is not.
What are primary and secondary markets?
First of all, it is worth clarifying the concepts:
- Primary or main markets: those directly linked to the outcome of the match, such as “who wins the game,” “how many goals will be scored,” or “exact score.” They are the most liquid, with a large volume of bets and participation from casual bettors.
- Secondary or individual action markets (side bets): involve specific events within the game that do not directly alter the final score. Examples: number of corners, cards received, first foul, or even individual player performance (number of shots, fouls committed, etc.).
In practice, secondary markets are smaller, with less volume and greater traceability of movements.
Where does manipulation really occur?
The Global Integrity in Action 2024 report, by Sportradar — one of the world’s leading references in betting monitoring — analyzed 1,108 football matches with signs of manipulation. The results are revealing:
- 43% of cases occurred in combined bets, focusing on the final result of the sporting event (win, loss, draw) and total goals;
- 30% in bets only on total goals (over/under);
- 7% on exact score;
- 7% on defeats by minimum margin;
- 13% in other markets, including cards and fouls.
That is, more than 85% of manipulation occurs in the main markets, i.e., those that concern the outcome of the match. Only a small portion involves individual actions, i.e., secondary markets.
Another Sportradar study, with data from 2009 to 2014, identified 1,625 suspicious matches. Only 0.37% of cases were related to side bets such as yellow cards.
Recent examples
In Brazil, the case of player Ênio, from Juventude, in the first round of this year’s Brasileirão, drew attention. Several betting operators detected unusual activity involving bets on the athlete receiving a yellow card, with values far above market standards. These irregularities could only be detected because the card market was legally offered in Brazil.
If that market had been prohibited here, the manipulation would have occurred in the same way on foreign sites — even physical shops in England received suspicious bets — but the Brazilian regulator would have had no visibility.
A global phenomenon, without borders
Match-fixing is not a local problem but a global one. Cases of spot-fixing (manipulation of specific events) have already occurred in different sports and countries:
- Cricket in India: players fixing the exact moment of a no-ball (illegal delivery).
- Tennis: athletes deliberately losing sets or specific games, common targets of illegal betting.
- Baseball and international football: match-fixing scandals documented by Interpol and Europol, always involving transnational organized crime networks.
These examples show that restricting markets within Brazil does not prevent their availability in other countries — regulated or not. Bettors (including those involved in fraud) simply migrate to where these markets are available.
Organized crime, with or without restrictions on the supply of secondary markets by Brazilian operators, will continue to target Brazilian athletes, since these markets exist in other jurisdictions. Bets on Brazilian secondary markets do not occur only in Brazil; in fact, most of them take place abroad. Companies based in countries such as Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, the United States, Russia, England, and Australia, among others, offer bets on individual performances of athletes playing in Brazil: corners, fouls, assists, tackles, cards, etc.
The risk of a false solution
Banning bets on individual events can generate harmful effects:
- Creating a false sense of security for bettors and operators;
- Encouraging migration to the illegal market, where there is no oversight, increasing risks of fraud and revenue loss;
- Blinding the regulator, since suspicious movements would no longer be monitored by licensed operators. Today, suspicious activity alerts are based on abnormal betting volumes detected by operators. If operators are prohibited from offering these markets, they will no longer have information on secondary markets and, consequently, will not be able to inform Brazilian authorities about signs of manipulation, leaving them in the dark.
International experience confirms this concern. When the Swedish regulator, for example, banned bets on cards and fouls, international experts warned that the measure was ineffective, as manipulators migrated to parallel markets, beyond the Swedish system’s reach. The result: less consumer protection and greater exposure to the illegal market.
What really works?
If the goal is to protect sports integrity, the most effective strategies are:
- Educating athletes and referees, preparing them to resist attempts of bribery;
- Strengthening national and international integrity systems, with continuous monitoring and data cross-checking;
- Institutional integration between the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Sports, Justice, and oversight agencies; and
- Coordinated international cooperation, since match-fixing is a transnational crime: Brazilian authorities need to work together with regulators from other jurisdictions to share information, identify suspicious patterns, and dismantle criminal networks operating in multiple countries.
Conclusion
Match-fixing is a real and growing challenge. But blaming individual betting markets is a misdiagnosis. The data show that most manipulations occur in the main markets, where there is greater volume and liquidity.
More than restricting markets, Brazil needs to invest in smart regulation, transparency, international cooperation, and consistent public policies on sports integrity.
The answer to the problem is not banning bets on corners or cards, but building a regulated, robust, and reliable environment that protects sports, fans, and investors.
Rafael Marchetti Marcondes
Professor of Sports, Entertainment and Tax Law. PhD and Master in Tax Law from PUC/SP. MBA in Sports Management from ISDE Barcelona/ES. MBA in Sports Betting Management from the University of Ohio/USA. Chief Legal Officer at Rei do Pitaco. President of the Association of Bets and Fantasy Sport (ABFS).
